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Abstract—Cyber situation awareness has been recognized as
a vital requirement for effective cyber defense. Cyber situation
awareness allows cybersecurity operators to identify, understand,
and anticipate incoming threats. Achieving and maintaining the
cyber situation awareness is a challenging task given the contin-
uous evolution of the computer networks, increasing volume and
speeds of the data in a network, and rising number of threats
to network security. Our work contributes to the continuous
evolution of cyber situation awareness by the research of novel
approaches to the perception and comprehension of a computer
network. We concentrate our research efforts on the domain of
IP flow network monitoring. We propose improvements to the IP
flow monitoring techniques that enable the enhanced perception
of a computer network. Further, we conduct detailed analyses
of network traffic, which allows for an in-depth understanding
of host behavior in a computer network. Last but not least, we
propose a novel approach to IP flow network monitoring that
enables real-time cyber situation awareness.
Index Terms—cyber situation awareness, IP flow, monitoring,
network, real-time, host identification
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer networks have become an inherent part of our
everyday life. They facilitate a variety of services, including
the ones critical for society. As society has become increas-
ingly dependent on these services, computer networks have
become lucrative targets for various attackers and fraudsters.
The protection of computer networks from harm caused by
attackers has become an important topic. An essential prereq-
uisite for the adequate protection of a computer network is an
ability to perceive the processes in the network, comprehend
their meaning and relations, and predict the future state of a
network – in other words, to gain a cyber situation awareness.
Cyber situation awareness is a concept that supports cy-
bersecurity operations in cyber defense. The goal of this
concept is to provide an operator with sufficient information
that enables him/her to make an informed decision on network
protection. The mainstream approach to cyber situation aware-
ness defines three levels that form the awareness [15, 16]:
perception, comprehension, and prediction. The perception
level serves to obtain data from a monitored environment,
the comprehension level aims to understand the information
contained in the data, and the goal of the prediction level is
to predict the future state of the environment.
IP flow monitoring represents a widely used approach
for obtaining network visibility [17]. It processes informa-
tion from packet headers and aggregates the packets into
connection-like records, so-called IP flows [18]. Compared to
other methods of network monitoring, e.g., deep packet inspec-
tion, the IP flow monitoring enables to process a significantly
larger volume of network traffic at higher speeds in exchange
for the lower amount of information provided. Due to its
properties, IP flow monitoring can be used for gaining cyber
situation awareness. It is frequently used for the perception of
information from computer networks. Moreover, analysis of
the collected IP flows serves well for network comprehension,
and even for prediction of the future state of a network, if
relevant techniques are applied.
Computer networks are dynamic environments that evolve
at a high pace. New technologies are continuously deployed,
the paradigms of service and network usage changes in time,
and new misuses and attacks are produced rapidly. Such
rapid development requires that cyber situation awareness
keeps pace with the evolution. The continuous development
of computer networks imposed several challenges and open
issues that are shared by both cyber situation awareness and
IP flow monitoring [16].
Our research work [1] aims to address the current challenges
of IP flow monitoring that lead to enhancement of the cyber
situation awareness so it can keep up with the development
of the computer networks. We propose improvements of IP
flow monitoring that enable a better perception of computer
networks and we provide the results of several analyses
that bring light into network processes and allow for deeper
network comprehension.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH GOALS
IP flow monitoring was originally designed for network ac-
counting and profiling. The accounting function of IP flow has
determined the design of IP flow monitoring infrastructures.
IP flows and associated IP flow monitoring infrastructures
are designed to provide a holistic view on a network with
the focus on regular network reporting. The original design
and purpose of IP flow, however, need to be continuously
transformed to address technological advances in networking
area (faster networks, software defined networks), the shift in
protocol usage (rise of encrypted traffic), and new possibilities
and paradigms for data processing in general. However, the IP
flow definitions, monitoring infrastructure, and related toolset
remain with the original purpose, which introduces discrepan-
cies in IP flow applications and other issues in flow processing
and analyses.978-1-7281-4973-8/20/$31.00 c○ 2020 IEEE
We have identified three main open issues of IP flow
network monitoring that affects the cyber situation awareness.
First, the IP flow monitoring needs to provide sufficient
visibility and information for effective cyber defense. Second,
the IP flow monitoring is designed for holistic observation of
a network from a connection perspective, not for monitoring
hosts in a network. Third, requirements for high analysis speed
and real-time network monitoring were not included in the
design of the traditional IP flow monitoring infrastructure. The
open issues are described in detail in the subsections below.
A. Lack of Network Visibility and Comprehension
When we started our research in 2013, the IP flow mon-
itoring provided visibility only into the network and trans-
port layers except for Flexible NetFlow that used NBAR
for application recognition. However, the used application
recognition only provided the type of an application protocol.
No additional application data were available although the
data from the application layer represents an information-rich
source that enables advanced network analysis and detection
of threats targeting applications.
The addition of the application information to the IP flow
monitoring increases the volume of the information available
on the one hand. On the other hand, it could lead to a
performance decline as additional data needs to be retrieved
from packets and processed. We believe that the possible
performance drop need to be investigated as it could make IP
flow monitoring ineffective considering the increasing speed
of network traffic. Hence, apart from the increasing the in-
formation value of IP flows, we study the trade-off between
the increased information value of IP flows and the associated
decrease of IP flow monitoring performance.
B. Host Identification in Network Traffic
The connection-based IP flows can be transformend to host-
based view. The comprehension of host-based information
from the transformed IP flow records is hindered by the
fact that a host is represented by an IP address in an IP
flow record. A single IP address can represent more hosts
in a network. Dynamically addressed networks can assign
a different IP address to a host each time it connects to
the network. Moreover, network translation devices (NATs)
or content delivery networks are represented by a single IP
address in IP flow records despite of the fact that they represent
more hosts. The fact that there is not only one-to-one host–
IP address relation prevents the correct assignment of relevant
information from IP flow records to a host. Auxiliary methods
for host identification need to be explored so that we do not
need to rely soley on IP address as a host’s identifier.
Several host’s characteristics can be observed in network
traffic. If correctly defined, these characteristics could create a
host’s fingerprint that could provide support for IP address
based host identification. The recent rise of the share of
encrypted network traffic, however, makes the identification
of these characteristics impossible at the application layer.
Hence, we study alternative approaches for host identification
in encrypted traffic to be able to identify hosts and to obtain
a complete view of a network.
C. Delays in IP Flow Monitoring Workflow
As the costs of a service downtime increase, any delay
present in the perception, comprehension, or prediction of
the computer network that postpones the achievement of the
cyber situation awareness is unwelcome. Network IP flow
monitoring includes several delays by design, though. A delay
occurs during the phase of IP flow creation as the IP flow
export is determined by timeouts. Another delay is introduced
during IP flow record analysis as IP flow records are analyzed
in batches which requires to wait until a batch is complete.
These delays can lead to substantial financial losses due to a
late response to an attack.
We believe that novel approaches to IP flow metering and
analysis need to be researched to obtain a real-time cyber
situation awareness and instant response and recovery. We
cannot reduce the delay without a significant redesign of the
IP flow monitoring workflow. It is essential to keep in mind
that the redesign of IP flow monitoring workflow changes the
nature of the generated IP flow records. Hence, apart from the
redesign of the IP flow monitoring process, also the approach
to IP flow analysis needs to be revised to provide real-time
cyber situation awareness.
D. Research Goals
The above-described research problems can be summarized
into the following main objective of our research:
Investigate how IP flow monitoring can be improved
to enhance the cyber situation awareness.
In light of the main objective, we identify the following
research goals (RG) that are motivated by the discovered
research problems:
RG1: Propose and evaluate IP flow monitoring methods
that enhance network perception and compre-
hension and respond to the emerging trends in
the cyber situation awareness and the IP flow
monitoring.
RG2: Develop methods for host identification in both
unencrypted and encrypted network traffic.
RG3: Provide an option for reducing the delays in the
network IP flow monitoring workflow leading to
the real-time cyber situation awareness.
The main results of our investigation of these research goals
are presented in the sections below.
III. RG1: ENHANCED IP FLOW VISIBILITY
To enhance the IP flow visibility into a network, we propose
the following innovations to the IP flow measurement that
provide information from the application layer of the network
traffic. First, we investigate IPv6 transition mechanisms and
their measurement. Next, we focus on obtaining of information
from HTTP protocol. To address the rising share of the
encrypted traffic, we propose a technique to obtain information
from the HTTPS protocol as well. Last, but not least, we
investigate the trade-off between the increased information
value of the IP flows achieved by adding the application layer
information and the performance decrease caused by parsing
additional information from network.
A. Network Traffic Tunneling
To perform a thorough inspection of tunneled traffic of the
IPv6 transition mechanisms, we need to decapsulate packet
headers of inner packets. In [2], we extend the approach
described in [19] and modify it to extract more detailed
information from tunneled data. Resulting IP flow records
provide us with information about the encapsulated source
and destination addresses, ports and transport protocol, which
is a common five-tuple used to distinguish individual flows.
We respect this principle and thus we separated the flows
encapsulated in the same tunnel based on the value of these
elements. Apart from these key elements the framework gives
information about Time to Live (TTL), encapsulated HOP
limit, TCP flags and ICMPv6 type and code, when present.
Moreover, additional information about tunnel type is pro-
vided, including Teredo header and trailer types when present.
Having gained the visibility into IPv6 transition tunnels, we
conducted several experiments to uncover the characteristics
of the network traffic related to these tunnels. We measured
frequency of TTL and HOP values of both encapsulated and
encapsulating traffic, location of IPv4 and IPv6 endpoints,
distributions of duration and sizes of the observed IP flows,
and location of the tunnel endpoints. The Figure 1 shows that
the encapsulated traffic origins mainly on the machines with































































































































Fig. 1. TTL value distribution of IPv4 traffic that contains IPv6 payload.
B. HTTP Protocol
The HTTP protocol has a number of properties that can be
monitored and exported together with IP flow data. The most
commonly monitored ones that are present in almost every
HTTP request or response header and that we selected for
our parsers are: HTTP method, status code, host, request URI,
content type, user agent and referer.
In [3], we describe our implementation and evaluation of
three different parsing algorithms. The first algorithm (strcmp
approach) loops the HTTP header line by line and searches
each line for given fields. It uses standard glibc string functions
like memchr, memmem and strncmp. The second algorithm
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Fig. 2. flex algorithm schema.
YAF to search the packet for specific patterns indicating HTTP
header fields. We designed the third algorithm (flex approach)
to handle each packet as a long string. It uses finite automaton
to find required HTTP fields, and the Flex lexer is used
to process the packets. The automaton design is shown in
Figure 2.
C. HTTPS Protocol
Having provided visibility to the HTTP network traffic, we
focused on the possibilities of obtaining additional informa-
tion from encrypted traffic, namely the User-Agents (UA) in
the HTTPS traffic [4]. To identify UA clients, we take an
approach of creating a dictionary containing pairs of SSL/TLS
handshake elements and UAs. We decided to use only a cipher
suite list from the ClientHello message to build up a dictionary.
Cipher suite lists (CS) are the most varied elements of the
SSL/TLS handshake, and we supposed that they are sufficient
for identifying clients. Other elements of the handshake only
have a few different values.
Our approach is based on the extraction of CSs and UAs
from SSL/TLS handshake and HTTP traffic respectively, and
the correlation of HTTP and HTTPS connections from a single
client. We assumed that web clients commonly communicate
via both HTTP and HTTPS protocols. We searched for HTTP
and HTTPS connections with the same source IP address. We
selected a cipher suite list from the HTTPS connections and
paired it to the User-Agent from the HTTP connection which
was the closest in time to create dictionary of CS-UA relations.
Based on the dictionary, we can then assign the UA to a
host communicating over HTTPS using the observed CS list,.
The thesis provides several experiments and evaluations of the
created dictionary, including the relation of the dictionary size
to the covered portion of network traffic, and cardinality of
the CS-to-UA relation.
D. Performance-Information Trade-off Evaluation
In the thesis, we provide a performance comparison of the
other approaches with our approach and with application-
less IP flow probes to investigate the impact of introducing
additional information value to the IP flow on the perfor-
mance of the IP flow monitoring [3]. The result of the
throughput comparison is displayed in Figure 3. We recognize
an over 50 % decreased performance when application-level
information is parsed, and the 300 % better throughput of the
optimized strcmp parsing algorithm compared to the others.
We further show that the addition of an extra HTTP header
information for parsing, once we are already parsing the HTTP
protocol, does not significantly decrease the performance of





























Fig. 3. Parser performance comparison with respect to HTTP proportion (0 %
- no HTTP, 100 % - only HTTP headers) in the traffic - full packets 1500 B.
IV. RG2: HOST IDENTIFICATION
This section presents our contributions to the host iden-
tification in network traffic. As mentioned before, due to
NAT devices, dynamically addressed networks, auxiliary host
identifiers apart from the IP address are necessary. We focus
on host’s operating system and type identifiers and investigate
the possibilities their identification both in static, dynamic
network, and in encrypted network traffic.
A. Static Networks
We compared the uniqueness of the auxiliary identifiers in
static and dynamic networks in [5, 6]. During the two hours
measurement period assigned for this experiment, we observed
10.221M flows from 12 897 hosts in the campus network.
33.5 % (3.425M) of all monitored flows contained information
needed for OS detection which represented 70.33 % (9 072) of
all hosts. We observed that in some cases more than one OS
was detected for one IP address. The cause of this behavior
could be dynamic addressing in networks. Therefore we re-
moved all dynamically addressed subnets from evaluation.
The results show that the portion of the IP addresses with
more than one detected OS has decreased after the removal
of dynamically addressed networks (see Table I). However,
still 4 % of IP shows characteristics of two or more OS even
after dynamically address subnets removal. This fact can be
explained by the presence of more devices with different OS
using the same IP address. This implies the presence of NAT
devices. Therefore, the OS detection can also be used as NAT
detection assuming that only a static addressed network is
monitored.
B. Dynamic Networks
The previous experiment showed the negative impact of dy-
namic address allocation on the uniqueness of OS. Therefore,
we further investigate the possibilities of OS identification
TABLE I
NUMBER OF UNIQUE OS DETECTED AT ONE IP.
# of OS # of IP in A % of all A # of IP in B % of all B
1 7898 87.059 3996 95.989
2 1071 11.806 159 3.819
3 80 0.882 7 0.168
> 3 23 0.253 1 0.024
Total 9072 100 4163 100
A - whole network, B - dynamically addressed subnets removed
from IP flow records in a dynamically addressed network
in [7]. We conduct an experiment to demonstrate the cov-
erage of IP flow based OS detection methods, and evaluate
them concerning accuracy, precision, and recall measures. The
dataset used in this experiment covers data from all subnets
of the wireless network of our university, including buildings
of multiple faculties and dormitories. The logs from DHCP
servers serves as the ground truth.
We compared the following approaches to the OS iden-
tification: TCP/IP parameters (e.g., TTL, SYN packet size,
TCP window size) and User-Agent. We further introduced
specific domain method for OS identification. It distinguish
the OS based on the connections to the well known domains
related with a specific OSs, e.g., the OS update servers. The
combination of all methods based on the designed weighting
system was evaluated as well. The results of the method
comparison is presented in Table II with User-Agent showing
the best performance.
TABLE II
MICRO AVERAGING FOR MULTI-CLASS CLASSIFIER PERFORMANCE
MEASURES.
Method Accuracy Precision Recall F-score
User-Agent 0.9189 0.9812 0.6063 0.7495
TCP/IP parameters 0.8088 0.5249 0.4643 0.4927
Specific domains 0.8402 0.6286 0.4907 0.5512
Combination 0.8582 0.6587 0.6041 0.6302
C. Encrypted Traffic
Using the approach described in the previous section, we
are able to identify User-Agent even in the encrypted network
traffic. The UA is a rich information source on the devices
characteristics. From UA, it is possible to determine the OS
of a host, the type of the device, and browser used as well.
Using the dictionary of the CS and UA, we analysed
network traffic at university campus to demonstrate the ability
to describe the characteristics of the hosts even from en-
crypted network traffic in [8]. The results show, that the most
frequent combination of host type (host/desktop/mobile) and
application used are “desktop:browser” with 34.3% followed
by the “mobile:browser” reaching the 14.7%. Among other
characteristics identified belongs “desktop:command line”, or
“mobile:application” pairs.
V. RG3: TOWARDS REAL-TIME CYBER SITUATION
AWARENESS
The delays present in the IP flow monitoring workflow
increase time needed to achieve cyber situation awareness.
In this section, we show, how can IP flows be analysed in
real time. We present an architecture for real-time IP flow
monitoring and discuss benefits and pitfalls of the real-time
analysis. Last, we outline an approach to real-time cyber
situation awareness.
A. Real-time IP Flow Analysis
We present a transformation of the current IP flow moni-
toring and analysis into the stream-based paradigm in [9]. In
this approach, the IP flows are processed and analyzed in data
streams immediately after an IP flow is observed. The analysis
of IP flows in data streams reduces the volume of data that
needs to be stored because data is kept in primary memory for
the time necessary for processing and only results are stored
in the secondary memory. This feature represents the greatest
advantage of the stream-based concept. It allows us to perform
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Fig. 4. The architecture of a stream-based IP flow analysis framework.
A general architecture design for stream-based IP flow
analysis framework is depicted in Figure 4. The core of the
framework is a system for distributed data stream processing,
e.g., Spark, that is able to process more than 500 000 flows
per second [20]. This system is fed with data by a messaging
system, e.g., Kafka, which enables parallel data distribution,
creation of different data streams so data can be analyzed in
parallel. The messaging system is connected to a traditional IP
flow source. We also present a Stream4Flow framework [10]
that implements this design and was deployed in campus
network to demonstrate on-the-fly processing of IP flows in
large network.
The presented stream-based approach to IP flow analy-
sis brings both several benefits compared to the traditional
batch-based approach. There are pitfalls as well. Among the
identified benefits belong (1) real-time view into a network
traffic so a short burst of network traffic otherwise lost in
aggregation can be identified, (2) faster query processing as
data are analysed in the primary memory, scalability due to
distributed nature of the system, (3) MapReduce programming
principle that enables to parallelize computations, increases
throughput, and allows to compute hosts characteristics in
real-time, for example. The pitfalls connected with the stream-
based approach are (1) coherent timestamping of the data in
the workflow as wrong timestamps of the data may introduce
discrepancies in analyses, (2) increased variability of the data
as the observation window is smaller and data are more
volatile, and (3) no ex-post queries as the data can be analysed
only after a query is formulated in the stream-based approach.
B. Toward Real-time Network-wide Cyber Situation Aware-
ness
Having introduced the architecture for real-time IP flow
monitoring, we combine the traditional batch-based approach
to IP flow monitoring with the real-time approach to achieve a
complex solution that provides real-time network-wide cyber
situation awareness in [11]. To combine these two approaches
we take advantage of the concept called lambda architecture.
The lambda architecture consists of three layers, the batch
layer, the speed layer, and the serving layer. The batch layer
serves as long term storage and computes batch views on
the data. It represents the traditional approach to network
monitoring. The speed layer aims to provide real-time views
on the data, while the batch view is computed, which is
represented by real-time IP flow monitoring. The serving layer
combines the real-time views and the batch views together so
a user can get query results from both views.
Complex cyber situation awareness demands additional data
sources except IP flows – computer logs, network traffic
dumps, LDAP details, for example. To be able to process
these data in one system, a normalization component needs
to be introduced. The normalization transforms collected data
from various data sources into a general, interpretable data
format. Using this format, information from the different data
sources can be analyzed in one system, correlated, and they
can provide a complex view on the network. The overview
of the framework is presented in Figure 5. More in-depth
details on the requirements on the framework for complex
cyber situation awareness and the discussion of the proposed

























































































































































Fig. 5. Framework for perception and comprehension of a network.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents the results of the research [1] with the
aim to investigate, how IP flow monitoring can be improved
to enhance the cyber situation awareness. Our research con-
tributed to the following areas of IP flow monitoring, that
improve the overall situation awareness: enhanced network
visibility, host identification in network traffic, and real-time
cyber situation awareness based on the real-time IP flow
monitoring.
Specifically, we present significant improvements in moni-
toring HTTP and HTTPS network traffic, including evaluation
of the impact on the performance of the IP flow monitoring in-
frastructure. From the host identification research, we focused
on the identification of the auxiliary methods that improve the
current approaches. We explored methods for OS identification
and validated novel approaches in various types of networks.
Last, we investigated how can be a network monitored in real-
time. We designed a novel workflow for real-time IP flow
monitoring, described the approaches and pitfalls of IP flow
analysis in real-time, and generalized this approach to adoption
for cyber situation awareness.
Although we significantly contributed to several open issues
of cyber situation awareness, there are still remaining opportu-
nities for challenging and interesting future research. Among
others, we highlight the following areas worth further inves-
tigation: (1) prediction of attacks and attackers intention, (2)
correlation of information from various sources, IP flows and
logs, for example, (3) stream-based data mining approaches,
that enable obtaining complex information in real-time, and (4)
host trustworthiness estimation that would provide an operator
with a simple measure to asses each host in a network and
allow identification of hosts worth close attention.
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